Concerns about corruption in the Indonesian public sector have been on the rise in recent decades. Corruption has negative impact on economic development and good governance, among other aspects. Therefore, combating it is one of the most important issues that Indonesia aims to address at all government levels. The government has made great efforts to establish institutional frameworks designed to fight corruption, including reforming government institutions through decentralization, designing and enforcing anti-corruption laws, and strengthening the anti-corruption agencies. However, in practice, these attempts to strengthen formal institutions in controlling corruption seem inadequate. This study adds to current research by providing a sociological perspective on corruption. This study examines the role of informal institutions, including social relations, norms, and culture that influence public officials’ behavior to engage in corrupt acts. The study argues that just strengthening formal institution alone may not be enough to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. This study proposes that social relations and the norms of public officials can contribute to a more effective design and implementation of formal institutions concerning corruption. In the Indonesian case, this approach is still at an early stage, because most research on corruption is dominated by an economic perspective. This study first investigates how differences in Indonesian government settings affect variations in corruption networks (i.e., dyadic and triadic embeddedness on actor and case level). The focus thereby is on the effect of decentralization on the nature and prevalence of corruption networks. Second, focusing on social norms and the effect of cues on corrupt behavior, we suggest that individuals’ corrupt intentions could be influenced by the behavior of others in organizations. This study suggests that leader and peer compliance behavior are potential cues to frame the behavior of senior civil servants so as not to accept an offered bribe.
Promotor: Rafael Wittek
Co-Promotor: Liesbet Heyse
Defended: February 8, 2018
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